Education, Dynamic Signaling and Social Distance
Andrea Gallice ()
Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics
The paper enriches a standard signaling model of education with issues of social distance defined over educational achievements. More specifically it considers the effects that the presence of conformist and status seeking individuals has on educational dynamics. Under very reasonable assumptions about the composition of the society, the model endogenously displays a growing average level of schooling. As education rises, signals get noisy and potentially harmful for what concerns firms' profitability. Firms, in order to adjust their screening process, react with an increase of their educational requirements. All these dynamics are in line with recent trends and other stylized facts about education.
Keywords: education; signaling; status seeking; conformist behaviour. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D82 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Education, dynamic signalling, and social distance (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenec:1364
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