Who goes first? Strategic Delay and Learning by Waiting

Peter Wagner
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Peter Achim

Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper considers a "war of attrition" game in which agents learn about an uncertain state of the world through private signals and from their peers. I provide existence and uniqueness results for a class of equilibria that satisfy a "full-participation" condition, and show that asymmetries in the distribution of information can lead to excessive stopping and an oversupply of information relative to the social optimum.

Date: 2015-05-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Working Paper: Who goes first? Strategic Delay and Learning by Waiting (2015)
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