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Merger Policy to Promote Global Players? A Simple Model

Andreas Haufler and Søren Nielsen

Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: We use a simple framework where firms in two countries serve their respective domestic markets and a world market to analyze under which conditions cost-reducing mergers will be beneficial for the merging firms, the home country, and the world as a whole. For a national merger, the policies enacted by a national merger authority tend to be overly restrictive from a global efficiency perspective. In contrast, all international mergers that benefit the merging firms will be cleared by either a national or a regional regulator, and this laissez-faire approach is also globally efficient. Finally, we derive the properties of the endogenous merger equilibrium.

Keywords: merger policy; international trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 H77 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Merger policy to promote 'global players'? A simple model (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Merger policy to promote ’global players’? A simple model (2008)
Working Paper: Merger Policy to Promote ‘Global Players’? A Simple Model (2005) Downloads
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