Direct vs Indirect Payments for Environmental Services: The Role of Relaxing Market Constraints

Ben Groom and Charles Palmer

No 36.2008, Environmental Economy and Policy Research Working Papers from University of Cambridge, Department of Land Economics

Abstract: Ferraro and Simpson (2002) argue that when markets are competitive, direct payments for environmental services are more cost effective in achieving environmental goals than indirect payments, say, for capital. However, when eco-entrepreneurs face non-price rationing in input or output markets, as is typical for e.g. credit in developing countries for, we show that interventions which relax constraints can be more cost-effective than direct payments. One corollary of this is that such indirect payments can be preferred to direct payments by interveners (e.g. NGOs) and eco-entrepreneurs alike. Both of these outcomes are more likely when constraints are severe.

Date: 2008, Revised 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.landecon.cam.ac.uk/RePEc/pdf/200836.pdf
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.landecon.cam.ac.uk/RePEc/pdf/200836.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.landecon.cam.ac.uk/RePEc/pdf/200836.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lnd:wpaper:200836

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Environmental Economy and Policy Research Working Papers from University of Cambridge, Department of Land Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Unai Pascual ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).