EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Does Experience Affect Fairness and Reciprocity in Lab Experiments?

Tiziana Medda (), Vittorio Pelligra and Tommaso Reggiani ()
Additional contact information
Tiziana Medda: University of Cagliari

No wpC09, CERBE Working Papers from CERBE Center for Relationship Banking and Economics

Abstract: One of the most common criticisms about the external validity of lab experiments in economics concerns the representativeness of participants usually considered in these studies. The ever-increasing number of experiments and the prevalent location of research centers in university campuses produced a peculiar category of subjects: Students with high level of laboratory experience built through repeated participations in experimental sessions. We investigate whether the experience accumulated in this way biases subjects’ behaviour in a set of simple games widely used to study social preferences (Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, Trust Game, and Prisoner’s Dilemma Game). Our main finding shows that subjects with a high level of experience in lab experiments do not behave in a significantly different way from novices.

Keywords: Experimental Methodology; External Validity; Experience; Lab Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D03 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2016-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cse, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-hrm and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://repec.lumsa.it/wp/wpC09.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lsa:wpaper:wpc09

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CERBE Working Papers from CERBE Center for Relationship Banking and Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Pierluigi Murro ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:lsa:wpaper:wpc09