Spying in Multi-market Oligopolies

Sudipta Sarangi, Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard and Subhadip Chakrabarti

Departmental Working Papers from Department of Economics, Louisiana State University

Abstract: We consider a multimarket framework where a set of firms compete on two interrelated oligopolis- tic markets. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can spy on others in order to increase the quality of their product. We characterize the equilibrium espionage networks and networks that maximize social welfare under the most interesting scenario of diseconomies of scope. We find that in some situations firms may refrain from spying even if it is costless. Moreover, even though spying leads to increased product quality, there exist situations where it is detrimental to both consumer welfare and social welfare.

Date: 2009-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.lsu.edu/business/economics/files/workingpapers/pap09_11.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Spying in Multi-market Oligopolies (2010)
Working Paper: Spying in Multi-market Oligopolies (2010)
Working Paper: Spying in multi-market oligopolies (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2009-11

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Departmental Working Papers from Department of Economics, Louisiana State University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().