Local Spillovers, Convexity and the Strategic Substitutes Property in Networks

Sudipta Sarangi, Pascal Billand and Christophe Bravard

Departmental Working Papers from Department of Economics, Louisiana State University

Abstract: We provide existence results in a game with local spillovers where the payoff function satisfies both convexity and the strategic substitutes property. We show that there always exists a stable pairwise network in this game, and provide a condition which ensures the existence of pairwise equilibrium networks. Moreover, our existence proof allows us to characterize a pairwise equilibrium of these networks.

Date: 2011-01
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Related works:
Working Paper: Local Spillovers, Convexity and the Strategic Substitutes Property in Networks (2011)
Working Paper: Local Spillovers, Convexity and the Strategic Substitutes Property in Networks (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2011-01

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