Employment-at-Will Exceptions, Social Welfare Programs and the Decline of Unions

Christopher K. Coombs and Robert Newman ()

Departmental Working Papers from Department of Economics, Louisiana State University

Abstract: Evidence from a fairly extensive literature in economics concludes that the adoption by state courts of exceptions to the common law employment-at-will doctrine has had far-reaching unintended impacts on firm behavior and labor market outcomes on several behaviorally distinct margins. We extend this literature by examining their unintended effects on union membership. Additionally, we examine the unintended effects on union membership that resulted from government adoption of union-like social welfare programs. Our results strongly suggest that these legal and policy interventions, which provide just-cause protections, social insurance and health and safety protections, have had the unintended effects of contributing to the long-run decline in union density.

Date: 2020-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2020-01

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