Compliance Monitoring and Agri-Environmental Policy
Chongwoo Choe () and
Iain Fraser ()
No 1997.08, Working Papers from School of Economics, La Trobe University
This paper uses an optimal contract approach to examine the issue of compliance monitoring in agri-environmental policy when the farmer is risk neutral and risk averse. The environmental agency chooses monitoring accuracy and payments for farmer's (non-)compliance. With a risk-neutral farmer, an optimal policy involves maximum allowable reward for compliance and maximum allowable penalty for non-compliance.
Keywords: Information; Environmental Management EDIRC Provider-Institution: RePEc:edi:smlatau (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Compliance Monitoring and Agri‐Environmental Policy (1999)
Working Paper: Compliance Monitoring and Agri-Environmental Policy (1997)
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