Contract Management Responsibility System and Profit Incentives in China's State-Owned Enterprises

Chongwoo Choe and Xiangkang Yin

No 1998.06, Working Papers from School of Economics, La Trobe University

Abstract: While the enterprise reform in China has provided incentives to its state-owned enterprises (SOEs), their poor performance relative to other forms of enterprises remains puzzling. This paper provides an answer to this puzzle by studying optimal managerial decisions under the enterprise reform.

Keywords: Enterprises; China; Ownership EDIRC Provider-Institution: RePEc:edi:smlatau (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 1998
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Journal Article: Contract management responsibility system and profit incentives in China's state-owned enterprises (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ltr:wpaper:1998.06

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