Sharing the greenhouse: Inducing cooperation in a global common
Damien Eldridge ()
No 2008.07, Working Papers from School of Economics, La Trobe University
Global warming is an example of a global tragedy of the commons. The atmosphere is a global common property resource. The global nature of this resource makes global warming a particularly difficult problem to solve. The reason for this is that there is no world government that can introduce and enforce the standard solutions for common property resource problems in this case. Any solution will need to be voluntary, in the sense that each country must choose to participate in it. This raises the important issue of just how such voluntary cooperation might be obtained. In this paper, we explore the potential for repeated interaction between countries to induce them to cooperate in combating global warming.
Keywords: Cooperation; Global Warming; Gradual Commitment; Multiple Interaction; Prisoners Dilemma; Repetition; Tragedy of the Commons EDIRC Provider-Institution: RePEc:edi:smlatau (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D62 D74 H23 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.latrobe.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/130913/2008.07.pdf First version, 2008.07.pdf (application/pdf)
Working Paper: Sharing the greenhouse: Inducing cooperation in a global common (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ltr:wpaper:2008.07
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from School of Economics, La Trobe University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Stephen Scoglio ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).