The Price of Silence: Markets for Noise Licenses and Airports

Thierry Bréchet and Pierre Picard

DEM Discussion Paper Series from Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg

Abstract: This paper presents a market design for the management of noise pol- lution created by aircraft tra¢ c around airports. A local market for noise licenses allows noise generators to compensate noise victims. We show that the market allows the market designer to achieve his/her optimal allocation of flights provided that he/she does not over-weight the benefit of economic activity compared to the disutility of noise pollution. The fact that local rep- resentatives of noise victims may be strategic players does not fundamentally alter this finding. Because of the market auctioneer's information constraints, noise licenses are likely to distribute windfall gains to residents, which alter the urban structure in the long run.

Date: 2008
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http://wwwfr.uni.lu/content/download/16900/214243/ ... 20and%20Airports.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: THE PRICE OF SILENCE: MARKETS FOR NOISE LICENSES AND AIRPORTS (2010)
Working Paper: The price of silence: markets for noise licenses and airports (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:luc:wpaper:08-08

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