Sustainable Migration Policies

Pierre Picard and Timothy Worrall

DEM Discussion Paper Series from Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg

Abstract: This paper considers whether countries might mutually agree a policy of allowing free movement of workers. For the countries to agree, the short run costs must outweighed by the long term benefits that result from better labor market flexibility and income smoothing. We show that such policies are less likely to be adopted for less risk averse workers and for countries that trade more. More surprisingly we find that some congestion costs can help. This reverses the conventional wisdom that congestion costs tend to inhibit free migration policies.

Keywords: Migration; Self-enforcing Mechanism; Repeated Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 J61 R23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mig
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http://wwwen.uni.lu/content/download/30831/368147/ ... ation%20Policies.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Sustainable migration policies (2011)
Working Paper: Sustainable Migration Policies (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:luc:wpaper:10-12

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