Differential Games with (A)symmetric Players and Heterogeneous Strategies

Benteng Zou

DEM Discussion Paper Series from Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg

Abstract: One family of heterogeneous strategies in differential games with (a)symmetric players is developed in which one player adopts an anticipating open-loop strategy and the other adopts a standard Markovian strategy. Via conjecturing principle, the anticipating open-loop strategic player plans her strategy based on the possible updating the rival player may take. These asymmetric strategies frame nondegenerate Markovian Nash Equilibrium, which could be subgame perfect for autonomous system with infinite time horizon. Except the stationary path, this kind of strategy makes the study of short-run trajectory possible, which usually are not subgame perfect. However, the short-run non-perfection provides very important policy suggestions. Differential game, Heterogeneous strategy, subgame perfect Markovian Nash Equilibrium, anticipating open-loop strategy

JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-ore
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Related works:
Journal Article: Differential Games with (A) symmetric Players and Heterogeneous Strategies (2016)
Working Paper: Differential Games with (A)symmetric Players and Heterogeneous Strategies (II) (2014)
Working Paper: Differential Game with (A)symmetric Players and Heterogeneous Strategies (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:luc:wpaper:15-06

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