On the impact of indirect competition for political influence on environmental policy

Fabien Prieur and Benteng Zou

DEM Discussion Paper Series from Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg

Abstract: Motivated by the history of climate politics in the US over the last decades, this paper aims at studying the impact of indirect competition for political influence, through environmental awareness raising vs disinformation campaigns, on environmental and economic performance. The analysis of the game in which groups devote efforts to bring the majority’s concern closer to their views shows a strong asymmetry in the results. Strategic interaction may lead the economy to a better situation in the long run, compared to what would prevail in the absence of lobbying. But this only occurs when the environmental group exhibits a radical ideology and people’s awareness is initially closer to that of the industrial group. By contrast, economies with very aggressive conservative groups and with people originally well aware of environmental problems can never benefit from the outcome of the game of political influence. The latter result is reinforced when one accounts for different lobbying powers and supremacy of industrial groups. This may explain why the US have failed to take action on global warming up to now.

Keywords: Public persuasion; environmentalists; industrialists; environmental awareness; information campaigns; disinformation; game of political influence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D72 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-cdm, nep-ene, nep-env, nep-pol and nep-res
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:luc:wpaper:17-16

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