Cloturing Deliberation

Vincent Anesi and Mikhail Safronov ()
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Mikhail Safronov: University of Cambridge, UK

DEM Discussion Paper Series from Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg

Abstract: We study how the institutional arrangements for ending deliberation - the “cloture Rules” - interact with collective learning to affect the outcomes of decision making in committees. In contrast to much of the previous literature on deliberative commit- tees, this paper makes a distinction between the final votes over policy proposals and the cloture votes that bring them about. Using this approach, we explore how clo- ture rules influence the course of deliberation, the likelihood of inefficient deliberative outcomes, the circumstances surrounding failures to bring proposals to a final vote, and the distribution of power among committee members in the deliberative process. We also use our simple model to examine the issue of the stability of cloture rules, characterizing the rules that no coalition of committee members is able or willing to overturn. We show in particular that all cloture rules are dynamically stable.

Keywords: Cloture; deliberation; obstruction; pivots; political failure; stability; voting. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D71 D72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:luc:wpaper:21-03

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