Direct Democracy, Partial Decentralization and Voter Information: Evidence from Swiss Municipalities

Sergio Galletta

IdEP Economic Papers from USI Università della Svizzera italiana

Abstract: In this paper I investigate whether changes in the availability of direct democratic institutions in local Swiss jurisdictions affect expenditure decentralization. By using a panel-based difference in differences estimation I find a statistically significant reduction in decentralization when the mandatory fiscal referendum is introduced at the local level. This result is consistent with the proposed theoretical framework. Direct democracy increases citizens' awareness of governments' behaviour which eventually affects politicians' electoral incentives. When officials from two different levels of government share the responsibility for the provision of public goods, they find it convenient for electoral purposes to favor expenditures where citizens have the lowest control over government actions.

Keywords: Direct Democracy; Fiscal Referendum; Partial Decentralization; Vertical Interaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H76 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2015-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Direct democracy, partial decentralization and voter information: evidence from Swiss municipalities (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lug:wpidep:1501

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