The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on the Size of State International Environmental Agreements

Bruno Nkuiya ()

Cahiers de recherche CREATE from CREATE

Abstract: This paper extends the standard model of self-enforcing dynamic international environmental agreements by allowing the length of the period of commitment of such agreements to vary as a parameter. It analyzes the pattern of behavior of the size of stable coalitions, the stock of pollution, and the emission rate as a function of the length of the period of commitment. It is shown that the length of the period of commitment can have very significant effects on the equilibrium. We show numerically that at the initial date, as the length of commitment is increased, the potential gain from cooperation tends to diminish, increasing the disincentive to ratify the agreements. This suggests that considerable attention should be given to the determination of the length of such international agreements.

Keywords: International environmental agreements; global pollution; stock pollution; dynamc games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 F53 Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-env
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on the Size of Stable International Environmental Agreements (2012)
Working Paper: The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on the Size of Stable International Environmental Agreements (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:creacr:2012-7

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