The commitment value of funding pensions
Jean-Denis Garon
Cahiers de recherche from Chaire de recherche Industrielle Alliance sur les enjeux économiques des changements démographiques
Abstract:
This paper studies how funding public pensions can improve policy outcomes when short-sighted governments cannot commit. We focus on sustainable plans, where op-timal nonlinear pensions are not reneged on by sequential governments. Funding pen-sions is a commitment mechanism. It implies lower contributions than does the second best policy, which reduces temptation to over-redistribute later and to misuse revealed private information. Funding may be preferable even if the population growth rate is higher than the rate of return on assets. Second best optimal policies are also more likely to be renegotiation proof under fully funded pensions.
Keywords: Pensions; Commitment; Redistribution; Funding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H31 H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age
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Journal Article: The commitment value of funding pensions (2016) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:criacr:1602
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