Adversarial Persuasion with Cross-Examination

Claude Fluet and Thomas Lanzi

Cahiers de recherche from Centre de recherche sur les risques, les enjeux économiques, et les politiques publiques

Abstract: Two parties with opposed interests invest in acquiring evidence which they may only partially disclose. The decision maker then adjudicates. This set-up is compared with one permitting cross-examination of the other party?s report. Now the decision maker can better assess whether a report was deceitful through withholding of evidence. Nevertheless, decision-making need not be improved. The parties invest less in gathering evidence because they are less able to successfully manipulate information and because cross-examination is a substitute in potentially countering the other party. From the decision maker's standpoint, there is too much cross-examination at the expense of too little direct evidence.

Keywords: disclosure; persuasion; evidence; adversarial; cross-examination; judicial procedures. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:crrecr:1811

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