Optimal Auditing for Insurance Fraud

Georges Dionne (), Florence Giuliano and Pierre Picard

Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE

Abstract: This article aims at making a bridge between the theory of optimal auditing and current procedures applied to audit files in different markets where scoring is the instrument used to implement an audit strategy. The literature has not yet developed an optimal audit policy for the scoring methodology. Our application is meant for the audit of insurance fraud but can be applied to many other activities that use the scoring approach. On the theoretical side, we show that the optimal auditing strategy takes the form of a "Red Flags Strategy" which consists in referring claims to a Special Investigation Unit (SIU) when certain fraud indicators are observed. Fraud indicators are classified based on the degree to which they reveal an increasing probability of fraud and this strategy remains optimal if the investigation policy is budget constrained. Moreover, the auditing policy acts as a deterrence device. On the empirical side, four significant results are obtained with data from a large European insurance company. First, we are able to compute a critical suspicion index for fraud, providing a threshold above which all claims must be audited. Secondly, we obtain that if the insur applies this policy, he will save more than euro22 milllion, which represents 43% of the current cost of fraudulent claims. Thirdly, we show that it is possible to improve these results by using information capable of isolating different groups of insureds with different morale costs of fraud. Finally, our results indicate how the deterrence effect of the audit scheme can be taken into account and how it affects the optimal auditing strategy.

Keywords: Optimal audit; scoring methodology; insurance fraud; red flags strategy; fraud indicators; suspicion index; morale cost of fraud (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 G14 G22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias and nep-rmg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cirpee.org/fileadmin/documents/Cahiers_2003/CIRPEE03-29.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal auditing for insurance fraud (2009)
Working Paper: Optimal auditing for insurance fraud (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0329

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Manuel Paradis ().