Myopic Loss Aversion, Information Dissemination, and the Equity Premium Puzzle

Charles Bellemare (charles.bellemare@ecn.ulaval.ca), Michaela Krause, Sabine Kröger (skroger@ecn.ulaval.ca) and Chendi Zhang

Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE

Abstract: We experimentally disentangle the effect of information dissemination from the effect of the time horizon on the investment behavior of a myopically loss averse investor. Our findings show that varying the information condition only suffices to induce behavior that is in line with the hypothesis of Myopic Loss Aversion.

Keywords: Myopic loss aversion; information dissemination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0428

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