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The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony

Winand Emons () and Claude Fluet ()

Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE

Abstract: An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low procedural costs. When both parties testify, each of them distorts the evidence less than when they testify alone. When the fixed cost of testifying is low, the arbiter hears both, for intermediate values one, and for high values no party at all. The ability to commit to an adjudication scheme makes it more likely that the arbiter requires evidence.

Keywords: Evidence production; procedure; costly state falsification; adversarial; inquisitorial (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 K41 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-reg
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed

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Working Paper: The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony (2005) Downloads
Working Paper: The Optimal Amount of Falsfied Testimony (2005) Downloads
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