Gift Exchange within a Firm: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Charles Bellemare () and Bruce Shearer

Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE

Abstract: We present results from a field experiment testing the gift-exchange hypothesis inside a tree-planting firm paying its workforce incentive contracts. Firm managers told a crew of tree planters they would receive a pay raise for one day as a result of a surplus not attribuable to past planting productivity. We compare planter productivity - the number of trees planted per day - on the day the gift was handed out with productivity on previous and subsequent days of planting on the same block, and thus under similar planting conditions. We find direct evidence that the gift had a significant and positive effect on daily planter productivity, controlling for planter-fixed effects, weather conditions and other random daily shocks. Moreover, reciprocity is the strongest when the relationship between planters and the firm is long term.

Keywords: Subsidy; Marginal Tax Reforms; Egypt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Gift exchange within a firm: Evidence from a field experiment (2007)
Working Paper: Gift Exchange within a Firm: Evidence from a Field Experiment (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0708

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