Economics at your fingertips  

Equilibrium Excess Demand in the Rental Housing Market (revised)

Katherine Cuff () and Nicolas Marceau ()

Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE

Abstract: We develop a model of a competitive rental housing market with endogenous default due to income uncertainty. There is a large number of identical, potential suppliers who each face a fixed cost of entering the rental housing market. Those suppliers who choose to enter decide how many rental units to supply and the rental price to charge. Potential tenants who differ in their income and face an uninsurable income shock choose whether to engage in a costly search for rental housing. If they find a rental unit, then they must commit to a rental agreement before the income uncertainty is resolved. Consequently, some tenants may default on their rental payments. We show that tenancy default can explain persistent excess demand in the rental housing market without any government price regulations. With excess demand in equilibrium, some individuals are simply unable to find rental housing. We study both government regulations affecting the cost of default to the housing suppliers and the quality of rental units, and the imposition of rent control. We show that rent control can have non-standard effects on the access to rental housing and on welfare.

Keywords: Tenancy Default; Excess Demand; Rental Housing Policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: R21 R31 R38 D41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Manuel Paradis ().

Page updated 2021-01-25
Handle: RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0744