Non-Comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality

Winand Emons and Claude Fluet

Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE

Abstract: Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic called quality. The difference in the unobservable quality levels determines how the firms share the market. We consider two scenarios: in the first one, firms disclose quality; in the second one, they send costly signals thereof. Under non-comparative advertising a firm advertises its own quality, under comparative advertising a firm advertises the quality differential. In either scenario, under comparative advertising the firms never advertise together which they may do under non-comparative advertising. Moreover, under comparative advertising firms do not advertise when the informational value to consumers is small.

Keywords: Quality; Advertising; Disclosure; Signalling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L15 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-mkt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cirpee.org/fileadmin/documents/Cahiers_2011/CIRPEE11-39.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Non-comparative versus comparative advertising of quality (2012)
Working Paper: Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1139

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Manuel Paradis ().