The Global Fight against Child Trafficking: How Can It Be Won ?

Sylvain Dessy (), Caroline Orset and Legrand Yémélé Kana

Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE

Abstract: We study how countries can coordinate their national action plans so as to fight global child trafficking. As both the demand and supply of trafficked children are transboundary in scope, international cooperation may be necessary to mitigate cross-country externalities. We show that specialization is the main feature of international cooperation. We also show that the pattern of specialization depends only on the level of economic development of state-parties. In particular, specialization leads to asymmetric national action plans when state-parties have different levels of economic development: the governments of poorer countries specialize on fighting the supply of trafficked children from their territories, while the governments of richer countries specialize on fighting the demand arising within their territories.

Keywords: Child trafficking; externalities; international cooperation; cooperative equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 F53 J47 O19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1213

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