Peacekeeping: a Strategic Approach

Max Blouin

Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE

Abstract: This paper presents a theoretical model of conflict between two players, with intervention by a peacekeeping force. Peacekeepers are treated as a military contingent, capable of taking sides, acting as a third (independent) side in the war, or remaining inactive, depending on circumstances. This departs from previous models, in which peacekeeping was no more than a parameter affecting players' fighting costs. The main result is an optimal deployment strategy by peacekeepers, detailing the nature and level of intervention required under different circumstances; a strategy which results in the lowest possible level of warfare between the two antagonists. The credible threat of force (rather than mere intervention) is the strategy's key component.

Keywords: Peacekeeping; conflict; responsibility to protect (R2P) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 F53 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1235

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