Strategic Interactions in a One-Sector Growth Model

Eric Fesselmeyer, Leonard Mirman and Marc Santugini

Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE

Abstract: We study the effect of dynamic and investment externalities in a one-sector growth model. In our model, two agents interact strategically in the utilization of capital for consumption, savings, and investment in technical progress. We consider two types of investment choices: complements and substitutes. For each case, we derive the equilibrium and provide the corresponding stationary distribution. We then compare the equilibrium with the social planner’s solution.

Keywords: Capital accumulation; dynamic game; growth; investment; technical progress (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D81 D92 O40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-fdg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic Interactions in a One-Sector Growth Model (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1318

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