Social Norms and Legal Design
Bruno Deffains and
Claude Fluet ()
Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE
We compare fault-based and strict liability offences in law enforcement when behavior is influenced by informal prosocial norms of conduct. Fault tends to be more effective than strict liability in harnessing social or self-image concerns. When enforcement relies on fines and assessing fault is not too costly, the optimal legal regime is fault-based with a standard consistent with the underlying social norm if convictions would seldom occur under optimal enforcement; otherwise liability should be strict. When sanctions are nonmonetary or when stigmatization imposes a deadweight loss, the legal standard may be harsher or more lenient than the social norm.
Keywords: Social preferences; regulatory offences; law enforcement; strict liability; fault; legal standard; compliance; deterrence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 K4 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-soc
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Journal Article: Social Norms and Legal Design (2020)
Working Paper: Social Norms and Legal Design (2019)
Working Paper: Social Norms and Legal Design (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1520
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