International Competition between Public or Mixed Enterprises

Jean-Thomas Bernard (), Marc Dupéré and Michel Roland

Cahiers de recherche from Université Laval - Département d'économique

Abstract:

We develop a model in which two firms from different countries compete on each other domestic market. Each firm is jointly owned by the residents and the government of its country. The extent of the government's stake in the public enterprise is endogenous and it determines the weight given to domestic consumers' surplus in the firm's payoff function. We show that the choice of each government's stake depends on a trade-off between allocative efficiency on the domestic market and profitability of foreign markets. We also highlight the fact that the government's stake in one country has an impact on firms' behavior in both countries.

Keywords: Regulation; public enterprises; duopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 H42 L33 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Related works:
Working Paper: International Competition Between Public or Mixed Enterprises (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:laeccr:0301

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