First Order Comparative Statics in First Price Auctions with Almost Homogeneous Bidders

Bernard Lebrun ()

Cahiers de recherche from Université Laval - Département d'économique

Abstract:

Despite the lack of explicit formulas for the equilibrium of the first price auction in the general asymmetric setting, we obtain explicit expressions for the first order changes due to arbitrary deviations from the symmetric setting. From these expressions, we derive results of comparative statics. We extend some of these results to more general, not necessarily small nor from the symmetric case, changes of the valuation distributions

JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:laeccr:9924

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