INFORMAL REGULATION OF POLLUTION IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY; Empirical Evidence from Gujarat, India A

Vinish Kathuria (vinish67@yahoo.com)
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Vinish Kathuria: Madras School of Economics

Working Papers from Madras School of Economics,Chennai,India

Abstract: Recent literature has not only recognized the implementation limitations of formal regulation, but also appreciated the significance of informal regulation for achieving environmental goals for developing countries. Since most units in developing world fall under unorganized sector, even utility of some of the informal channels like public-disclosures is limited. Under the scenario, a localized channel like vernacular press has greater utility. Present study attempts to see whether this channel has any role to play in pollution control. To test, monthly water pollution data from four hotspots of Gujarat, India for the period Jan-96 to Dec-2000 is used. Analysis shows that informal regulation has worked partly as only sustained pressure leads to fall in pollution. However, not all stations are affected equally. It is mainly the station receiving water from industrial estate and housing somewhat large units respond to the informal pressure.

Keywords: Pollution; developing country; epririal evidence; gujarat (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 63 pages
Date: 2004-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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