Sudden Termination Auctions – An Experimental Study

Sascha Füllbrunn () and Abdolkarim Sadrieh

No 6024, FEMM Working Papers from Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management

Abstract: The design of markets has become a major issue due to the capability of online operators to implement almost any set of market rules overnight. With this study we contribute to the literature of market design by presenting a theoretical and experimental analysis of sudden termination auctions. Our main focus is on the candle auction that has a positive termination probability at any time in the course of the auction. The second price candle auction which is technically demanding and rarely implemented offline proves to be a faster and equally efficient alternative to standard hard close auctions.

Keywords: auctions; termination rules; electronic markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C9 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2006-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://www.fww.ovgu.de/fww_media/femm/femm_2006/2006_24.pdf First version, 2006 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Sudden Termination Auctions—An Experimental Study (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mag:wpaper:06024

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