Effizienzaspekte alternativer Streitbeilegung

Roland Kirstein

No 8021, FEMM Working Papers from Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management

Abstract: The paper compares the Nash bargaining solution of a simple settlement game (with perfect and complete information and imperfect decision making judges) to the equilibrium results of a trial game without settlement stage. The comparison allows for an evaluation of the efficiency of settlement with regard to primary and secondary cost. Das Paper stellt die Nash-Verhandlungslösung eines Vergleichsspiels (mit perfekter, vollständiger Information und imperfekten Gerichten) neben die Gleichgewichtslösungen eines Klagespiels ohne Vergleichsstufe. Die Ergebnisse erlauben Aussagen zu primären und tertiären Kosten (mithin zur Effizienz) von Prozessvergleichen.

Keywords: Zivilprozess; Vergleich; trial; efficiency; Nash bargaining solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2008-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ger and nep-gth
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