Media Competition and Information Disclosure

Ascension Andina-Diaz

No 2008-5, Working Papers from Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center

Abstract: This paper analyzes an election game where self-interested politicians can exploit the lack of information that voters have about candidates' preferred policies in order to pursue their own agendas. In such a setup, we study the incentives of newspapers to acquire costly information, and how competition among the media affect such incentives. We show that the higher the number of potential readers and/or the lower the cost or investigating, the more the newspapers investigate. We also show that the readers' purchasing habits play a crucial role in the model. More specifically, we show that if the readers always buy a newspaper, media competition favors information disclosure; whereas if they just buy a newspaper in the case news are uncovered, competition is not so desirable.

Keywords: Media competition; Political accountability; Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2008-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-com
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https://theeconomics.uma.es/malagawpseries/Papers/METCwp2008-5.pdf First version, 2008 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Media competition and information disclosure (2009)
Journal Article: Media competition and information disclosure (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mal:wpaper:2008-5

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