A case for Ambiguity

Ascension Andina-Diaz

No 2009-8, Working Papers from Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center

Abstract: A sender wishes to be approved by a receiver, who is outcome concerned. She then has an incentive to send an informative message. But if there is more than one sender competing for the receiver's approval and the latter doubts about the objectives of senders, they each have an incentive to fool the receiver and look as the only truthful sender in the population. If they succeed, no truthful equilibrium exists. In this scenario, we show that it may be in the decision maker's interest to be ambiguous about his motives as, if prospering, he could guarantee revelation of information by (at least) outcome concerned senders.

Keywords: Multiple experts; approval; two sided incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2009-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mal:wpaper:2009-8

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