How to Add Apples and Pears: Non-Symmetric Nash Bargaining and the Generalized Joint Surplus

Samuel Danthine and Noemí Navarro

No 2010-04, Working Papers from Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center

Abstract: We generalize the equivalence of the non-symmetric Nash bargaining solution and the linear division of the joint surplus when bargainers use different utility scales. This equivalence in the general case requires the surplus each agent receives to be expressed in compatible, or comparable, units. This result is valid in the case of bargaining over multiple-issues. In addition, we discuss the requirements on the curvatures of the agents’ utility functions, or, in other words, on the bargainers’ attitudes towards risk.

Keywords: Bargaining Problems; Non-Symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution; Linear Sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 J5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2010-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: How to Add Apples and Pears: Non-Symmetric Nash Bargaining and the Generalized Joint Surplus (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mal:wpaper:2010-4

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