Deciding Whether a Law is Constitutional, Interpretable, or Unconstitutional

Pablo Amoros, Ricardo Martinez (), Bernardo Moreno () and M. Socorro Puy

No 2010-09, Working Papers from Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center

Abstract: A high court has to decide whether a law is constitutional, un- constitutional, or interpretable. The voting system is runoff. Runoff voting systems can be interpreted both, as social choice functions or as mechanisms. It is known that, for universal domains of preferences, runoff voting systems have several drawbacks as social choice functions. Although in our setting the preferences are restricted to be single-peaked over three alternatives, these problems persist. Runoff mechanisms are not well-behaved either: they do not implement any Condorcet consistent social choice function in undominated subgame perfect Nash equilibria. We show, however, that some Condorcet consistent social choice functions can be implemented in dominant strategies via other simple and natural mechanisms.

Keywords: Runoff voting system; Condorcet consistency; strategy-proofness; implementation theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2010-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://theeconomics.uma.es/malagawpseries/Papers/METCwp2010-9.pdf First version, 2010 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Deciding whether a law is constitutional, interpretable, or unconstitutional (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mal:wpaper:2010-9

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ascension Andina ().