Manipulability in Restricted Separable Domains

Ricardo Martínez () and Bernardo Moreno ()
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Ricardo Martínez: Department of Economic Theory, Universidad de Málaga
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ricardo Martinez and Ricardo Martinez ()

No 2011-01, Working Papers from Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center

Abstract: We study a problem where a group of voters must decide which candidates are elected from a set of alternatives. The voters’ preferences on the combinations of elected candidates are represented by orderings. We propose a family of restrictions of the domain of separable preferences. These subdomains are generated from a partition that identifies, for each voter, her friends, her enemies and the unbiased candidates. We characterize the family of rules that satisfy strategy-proofness and tops-onliness on each of those subdomains.

Keywords: separable preferences; aggregation; strategy-prooness; tops-onliness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2011-02
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mal:wpaper:2011-1

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