Mass Media in Economics: Origins and Subsequent Contributions

Ascensión Andina Díaz ()
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Ascensión Andina Díaz: Department of Economic Theory, Universidad de Málaga
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ascension Andina-Diaz

No 2011-02, Working Papers from Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center

Abstract: An expert wishes to be approved by a receiver, who is outcome concerned. She then has an incentive to send an informative message. But if there is more than one expert competing for the receiver's approval and the latter doubts about the objectives of experts, they each have an incentive to make the receiver believe she is the only truthful expert in the population. If they succeed, no truthful equilibrium exists. In this scenario, we show that it may be in the receiver's interest to be ambiguous about his motives as, if prospering, he could guarantee revelation of information by (at least) outcome concerned experts.

Keywords: Multiple experts; approval; two sided incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2011-04
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