Like biases and information in elections

Ascensión Andina Díaz ()
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Ascensión Andina Díaz: Department of Economic Theory, Universidad de M‡laga
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ascension Andina-Diaz

No 2013-01, Working Papers from Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center

Abstract: We model an election between two downsian candidates and a third deterministic one. There is uncertainty about the state of the world. Candidates receive signals on the state and propose a policy to implement. There are two types of voters: social concerned and biased. For both the cases in which the deterministic candidate is biased towards the policy preferred by the majority or the minority group, we characterize all the government structures (coalition governments) that allow for information transmission by the two candidates. Our results show that the third candidate helps to restore the informativeness of the electoral process and that, contrary to expected, information transmission occurs more frequently when the deterministic candidate is biased towards the policy preferred by the majority than when he is against it. Loosely put, the more populist this candidate, the better.

Keywords: Multi-party electoral competition; heterogeneous voters; information transmission (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2013-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mal:wpaper:2013-1

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