A theory of media self-silence
Ascension Andina-Diaz () and
José A. García-Martínez ()
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José A. García-Martínez: Departamento de Estudios Económicos y Financieros, Universidad Miguel Hernández
No 2015-05, Working Papers from Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center
This paper proposes a theory of media self-silence. The argument is that news organizations have the power to raise public concern and so affect the probability that there is ex-post verification of the true state of the world. Built on the literature of career concerns, we consider a newspaper that seeks to maximize its reputation for high quality. Our results predict more media silence, the higher the prior expectations on the quality of the firm, the greater the probability of ex-post verification, and the higher the power of the newspaper to lead public opinion. We also obtain that the greater the social influence of a news organization, the stricter the firm's vetting process for stories is. Last, competition reduces media silence.
Keywords: Feedback power; reputation; quality; competition; media silence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mal:wpaper:2015-5
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