Conformity, information and truthful voting

Bernardo Moreno (bernardo@uma.es), Maria del Pino Ramos-Sosa and Ismael Rodriguez-Lara

No 2016-01, Working Papers from Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center

Abstract: We induce conformity in a binary-decision voting game by assuming that agents may derive some utility by voting the same option that others. Theoretically, we show that truthful voting is the unique equilibrium without conformity. Introducing conformity enlarges the set of equilibria, which includes voting profiles in which agents do not necessarily vote for their preferred option. If agents are informed that others will vote truthfully, truthful voting is more pervasive in equilibrium. In our setting, the effects of conformity and information depend on the voting rule and the preferred option of each agent. We provide empirical support for our theoretical predictions by means of a laboratory experiment.

Keywords: Issue-Silence; truthful voting, conformity, information, experimental evidence. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2016-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-pol and nep-upt
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