To Share or Not to Share: An Experiment on Information Transmission in Networks

Sergio Currarini, Francesco Feri, Bjoern Hartig and Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez ()
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Sergio Currarini: University of Leicester
Bjoern Hartig: Royal Hollloway, University of London

No 2020-06, Working Papers from Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center

Abstract: We design an experiment to study how agents make use of information in networks. Agents receive payoff-relevant signals automatically shared with neighbors. We compare the use of information in different network structures, considering games in which strategies are substitute, complement and orthogonal. To study the incentives to share information across games, we also allow subjects to modify the network before playing the game. We find behavioral deviations from the theoretical prediction in the use of information, which depend on the network structure, the position in the network and the strategic nature of the game. There is also a bias toward oversharing information, which is related to risk aversion and the position in the network.

Keywords: networks; experiment; information sharing; strategic complements; strategic substitutes; pairwise stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 D82 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-net, nep-soc and nep-ure
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Working Paper: To Share or Not to Share: An Experiment on Information Transmission in Networks
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mal:wpaper:2020-6

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