Strategic interactions, incomplete information and learning

Michele Berardi

Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series from Economics, The University of Manchester

Abstract: In a model of incomplete, heterogeneous information, with externalities and strategic interactions, we analyse the possibility of adaptive learning to act as coordination device. We build on the framework introduced by Angeletos and Pavan (2007) and extend it to a setting where agents need to learn to coordinate. We analyse conditions under which learning obtains, and show that adaptive learning can solve the problem of socially ine¢ cient coordination.

Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse and nep-cta
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Working Paper: Strategic interactions, incomplete information and learning (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:man:cgbcrp:157

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