Distributive Politics with Other-Regarding Preferences

Ming Tung Le, Alejandro Saporiti and Yizhi Wang

Economics Discussion Paper Series from Economics, The University of Manchester

Abstract: We extend upon the results of Lindbeck and Weibull [Public Choice 52 (3), (1987)] to study distributive politics when voters have not only self-interested preferences, but also other-regarding concerns. We consider a broad family of otherregarding behavior (including fairness preferences, income-dependent altruism, and inequality aversion), for which results on equilibrium existence and optimality have not been established yet. We provide a sufficient condition for smooth and nonsmooth payoffs that generalizes Lindbeck and Weibull’s condition, and guarantees the existence of a unique Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In addition, we determine conditions under which the equilibrium results in an income distribution that can be rationalised as the outcome of maximizing a mixture of a “self-regarding utilitarian” social welfare function and society’s other-regarding preferences.

JEL-codes: C72 D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Journal Article: Distributive politics with other‐regarding preferences (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:man:sespap:1804

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