A Generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem with Two Independent Probabilities of Error

Roland Kirstein and Georg v. Wangenheim
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Georg v. Wangenheim: University of Kassel

No 201011, MAGKS Papers on Economics from Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung)

Abstract: The Condorcet Jury Theorem is derived from the implicit assumption that jury members only commit one type of error. If the probability of this error is smaller than 0.5, then group decisions are better than those of individual members. In binary decision situations, however, two types of error may occur, the probabilities of which are independent of each other. Taking this into account leads to a generalization of the theorem. Under this generalization, situations exists in which the probability of error is greater than 0.5 but the jury decision generates a higher expected welfare than an individual decision. Conversely, even if the probability of error is lower than 0.5 it is possible that individual decisions are superior.

Keywords: Group decisions; judicial; imperfect decision-making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 K40 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mar:magkse:201011

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