Optimal Structuring of Assessment Processes in Competition Law: A Survey of Theoretical Approaches

Jürgen-Peter Kretschmer ()
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Jürgen-Peter Kretschmer: University of Marburg

No 201114, MAGKS Papers on Economics from Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung)

Abstract: In competition law, the problem of the optimal design of institutional and procedural rules concerns assessment processes of the pro- and anticompetitiveness of business behaviors. This is well recognized in the discussion about the relative merits of different assessment principles such as the rule of reason and per se rules. Supported by modern industrial organization research, which applies a more differentiated analysis to the welfare effects of different business behaviors, a full-scale case-by-case assessment seems to be the prevailing idea. Even though the discussion mainly focuses on extreme solutions, different theoretical approaches do exist, which provide important determinants and allow for a sound analysis of appropriate legal directives and investigation procedures from a ‘Law and Economics’ perspective. Integrating and examining them in light of various constellations results in differentiated solutions of optimally structured assessment processes.

Keywords: Law Enforcement; Competition Law; Competition Policy; Antitrust Law; Antitrust Policy; Decision-Making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 K21 K40 L40 L49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38pages
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-hme, nep-law and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mar:magkse:201114

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