Feedback and Emotions in the Trust Game
Ivo Bischoff () and
Özcan Ihtiyar ()
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Özcan Ihtiyar: University of Kassel
MAGKS Papers on Economics from Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung)
Abstract:
We conduct an experiment on the impact of feedback in the Trust Game. In our treatment group, the Trustee has the opportunity to give feedback to the Investor (free in choice of wording and contents). The feedback option is found to reduce the share of Investors who sent no resources to the Trustee, while the impact on average behavior is less pronounced. The notion proposed by Xiao and Houser (2005, PNAS) according to which verbal feedback and monetary sanctions are substitutes is not supported. We use the PANAS-scale (Mackinnon et al., 1999) to capture change in subjects’ short-run affective state during the experiment. Receiving feedback has an impact on the Investors’ short-run affective state but giving feedback is not found to have an effect on Trustees’ short-run affective state.
Keywords: Trust Game; Feedback; Short-run affect; Emotions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hpe, nep-neu and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mar:magkse:201503
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